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Which is my body and how do I distinguish it from the bodies of others, or from
objects in the surrounding environment? The perception of our own body and more
particularly our sense of body ownership is taken for granted. Nevertheless, experimental
findings from body ownership illusions (BOIs), show that under specific multisensory
conditions, we can experience artificial body parts or fake bodies as our own body parts
or body, respectively. The aim of the present paper is to discuss how and why BOIs
are induced. We review several experimental findings concerning the spatial, temporal,
and semantic principles of crossmodal stimuli that have been applied to induce BOIs.
On the basis of these principles, we discuss theoretical approaches concerning the
underlying mechanism of BOIs. We propose a conceptualization based on Bayesian
causal inference for addressing how our nervous system could infer whether an object
belongs to our own body, using multisensory, sensorimotor, and semantic information,
and we discuss how this can account for several experimental findings. Finally, we
point to neural network models as an implementational framework within which the
computational problem behind BOIs could be addressed in the future.
Keywords: body ownership, rubber hand illusion, multisensory perception, body semantics, causal inference
Introduction
“I swear to God, cross my heart, I haven’t (been kidding). A man should know his own body, what’s his
and what’s not—but this leg, this thing.... doesn’t feel right, doesn’t feel real—and it doesn’t look part of me”
(Sacks, 1985).
There would be nothing wrong or weird with the above statement, if we thought that the per-
son speaking had been referring to a fake leg, which for some unknown reason was placed
close to his body. However, in fact the quote is from a brain-damaged patient talking with his
doctor about his own paralyzed leg. The bizarre neurological syndrome of somatoparaphrenia
reveals that our ability to recognize our own body parts can dramatically deteriorate in cer-
tain brain damage conditions (Vallar and Ronchi, 2009; Feinberg et al., 2010). Astonishing as
it is, the case of somatoparaphrenia gives prominence to the multidisciplinary research topic
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(Gallagher, 2000; Jeannerod, 2003; Blanke and Metzinger, 2009;
de Vignemont, 2011) that aims to address a seemingly trivial
question: how does our brain distinguish between our own body
and those of other people or objects?
A key difference between the perception of our own body
and that of others’ bodies or objects in the environment lies
in the type of sensory input available to the brain. In process-
ing our own body, the brain has access to a set of sensory
information—such as somatosensation, thermosensation, noci-
ception, interoception, and vestibular signals—that is not avail-
able for the perception of other objects or bodies. Yet, evidence
from somatoparaphrenic patients suggests that the intact sen-
sory processing from separate modalities may not be in itself
sufficient for the emergence of the feeling of body ownership.
Indeed, it has been proposed that somatoparaphrenia may be due
to an impairment in processing multisensory signals (Vallar and
Ronchi, 2009). Therefore, the sense of body ownership should be
regarded as the outcome of the brain’s processes that integrate
different sensory cues into the unified perception of “my body.”
Another key difference concerns the fact that in own-body
perception all the sensory and motor cues that converge into
the “my body” percept are strictly bound by physical laws. For
example, when striking a fist on a table, the view of the contact
is always accompanied by the punching tactile sensation in our
hand. This is not the case for the perception of external objects or
others’ bodies that, although multisensory in nature, is not sub-
ject to such strict constraints. Just consider this example: you see
a dog in a park and you hear a barking sound at about the same
moment and coming from the same direction. Even if it is prob-
able that it was the seen dog that was barking, there is also the
possibility that there is a second dog just behind the tree. Thus,
while in the perception of external events we can contemplate the
possibility of different sources, in the perception of “my body”
this is not the case, since all multimodal cues involved originate
from the same source: the physical body.
Due to the fact that the body-related multimodal cues are
tightly bound together and not independent, it is difficult to
experimentally investigate body ownership with the methods
adopted in multisensory research. In contrast, when studying
the multisensory perception of external objects, including others’
bodies, experiments typically involve the concurrent presenta-
tion of sensory signals that are independent. This permits the
introduction of delays between the occurrences of the stimuli,
to present them from different positions, or even to manipulate
their information content so that thesemay refer to the same con-
text or not. Therefore, it is possible to investigate how multisen-
sory perception is influenced by the spatial, temporal, and seman-
tic relationships between the manipulated stimuli (Doehrmann
and Naumer, 2008; Alais et al., 2010). The same methods cannot
be directly applied to study body ownership. For example, it is
not possible to introduce a temporal delay between seeing our fist
striking the table and feeling the punching sensation in the hand,
unless through the use of devices such as cameras and displays.
Given the limitations inherent in the study of the physi-
cal body, experimental research has been extensively conducted
through exploiting the illusions of body ownership. In these illu-
sions, healthy adults experience non-bodily objects (e.g., artificial
limbs) as belonging to their own body, when presented with
crossmodal stimuli applied to the hidden real body part and its
fake counterpart. Due to the fact that the stimuli have two inde-
pendent sources (i.e., the real and the fake body part), exper-
imenters have been able to flexibly manipulate their spatial,
temporal, and semantic relationships. In this way, body own-
ership illusions (BOIs) therefore offer a powerful experimental
tool to examine how the sense of body ownership emerges from
multisensory processing operated by the brain.
Our understanding of how the brain builds the sense of body
ownership can benefit from identifying the basic principles that
govern the induction of body ownership illusions and formulat-
ing the latter within a computational framework. Consequently,
the aim of this paper is two-fold. First, to review the experimental
literature, investigating how the spatial, temporal, and semantic
congruencies of the tested crossmodal stimuli contribute to elic-
iting body ownership illusions. Second, to discuss and propose
different theoretical accounts that could possibly cast the experi-
mental findings into a unifying computational context. We start
by introducing body ownership illusions and distinguishing these
from other classes of body illusions that, together with the former,
have provided essential insights on how the own-body percept is
built through multisensory and sensorimotor information. Fol-
lowing this, we present the main results of experimental work
on body ownership illusions, classifying them on the basis of the
crossmodal triggers and semantic information that these have
manipulated. This classification is functional to the discussion of
different theoretical accounts of body ownership.
Body Illusions to Study Own-Body
Perception
Body illusions refer to those psychological phenomena in which
the perception of one’s own body importantly deviates from the
configuration of the physical one, e.g., in terms of size, location,
or ownership. Since their induction is achieved through multi-
sensory and/or sensorimotor stimulation, body illusions provide
essential insights on how the own-body percept is built in real-
time, on the basis of the stimuli that are currently available to the
brain.
A representative example of body illusions are the body distor-
tions illusions, in which people can perceive that the size or the
posture of their body part(s) have changed dramatically without
necessarily satisfying the anatomical constraints of the human
body. A method to induce illusory body distortions relies on
kinaesthetic illusions, in which blindfolded subjects experience
the illusory movement of a static body part and therefore non-
veridical proprioceptive states, when the tendon muscle of a
physically constrained joint is mechanically vibrated (Goodwin
et al., 1972). Importantly, the illusory motion of the stationary
body part can capture other non-movable body parts it is in
contact with, yielding the impression that these change in size
(Lackner, 1988; de Vignemont et al., 2005; Ehrsson et al., 2005b).
Similar distortion illusions have been shown to occur for numer-
ous other body parts (Lackner, 1988), to correlate with activation
of areas in the lateral parietal cortex (Ehrsson et al., 2005b) and
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to modulate the tactile processing on the body part perceived
as distorted (de Vignemont et al., 2005). A well-known exam-
ple is the Pinocchio illusion (Figure 1A). Alternatively, a distor-
tion illusion similar in phenomenology can be induced through
temporal correlations between undistorted proprioceptive infor-
mation and tactile input, as for example the phantom nose illu-
sion (Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1998) (Figure 1B). Indepen-
dently of the employed methodology, the body distortion illu-
sions demonstrate that the brain computes the perceived body
posture and shape dynamically and in a flexible fashion, without
the need to satisfy the anatomical constrains of the human body.
Another remarkable class of body illusions are the experi-
mentally induced out of body experiences, in which people per-
ceive their self to be dislocated from the spatial origin of their
visual perspective (Lenggenhager et al., 2007), and/or of look-
ing at their body from a distance (Ehrsson, 2007). One of the
first reports of these illusions was attained through the use of a
FIGURE 1 | Examples of body illusions. (A) The Pinocchio illusion. A
blindfolded participant receives vibration on his biceps while touching the tip of
his nose with his fingers. The illusory extension of the arm (Goodwin et al.,
1972) generates the illusion that his nose, his fingers or both are elongating
(Lackner, 1988). (B) The phantom nose illusion. The experimenter moves the
finger of a blindfolded participant to tap the nose of another subject, while
simultaneously tapping the nose of the participant. As the participant’s
movements and his finger contact with the other subject’s nose are
synchronous with the touch he receives on his nose, the participant
experiences the illusion of tapping his very long nose (Ramachandran and
Hirstein, 1998). (C) An out of body illusion. The participant sees a video of his
back as if he were located behind it. The experimenter touches the back of the
participant with a stick while the participant sees it online in the video. As the
seen and the felt stimulation is synchronous, the participant perceives illusory
drifts in his self-location toward the seen body (Lenggenhager et al., 2007). (D)
The rubber hand illusion. The participant sees a rubber hand placed in front of
him, while his real hand is concealed from view. The experimenter strokes both
hands at the same time, and after some time the participant perceives the fake
hand as if it were his own hand (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998).
mirror device and goes back to the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury (Stratton, 1896). In the recent experimental settings partic-
ipants wear a head mounted display (HMD), which is fed by a
camera that records the back of the participants from distance.
Thus, participants see their body from the back, i.e., from a third
person visual perspective (3 PP), in contrast with the first per-
son visual perspective (1 PP) that we normally have on our body
when looking downward. Through applying tactile stimulation
on the participants’ back while they see the instrument touching
their back in the online video, participants experience illusory
drifts in their self-location toward the body seen in the video
(e.g., Lenggenhager et al., 2007) (Figure 1C). Illusory changes in
self-location were also reported when subjects were tapped on
their chest with a stick while another stick was synchronously
waived underneath the cameras (e.g., Ehrsson, 2007). Analogous
illusory experiences were reported by subjects standing between
two mirrors that face each other, while stroking their cheek and
watching the several reflections of their bodies (Altschuler and
Ramachandran, 2007). Systematic experimental findings from
the out of body illusions demonstrate that the perceived loca-
tion of the self can be detached from that of the physical body,
similar to reports from patients undergoing out-of-body expe-
riences of neurological origin (Blanke and Mohr, 2005). This
class of illusions provides therefore an important benchmark for
studying the role of multisensory integration in the sense of self-
location and self-consciousness (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009;
Blanke, 2012).
Body Ownership Illusions
In distinction to body distortion and out of body illusions, Body
ownership illusions refer to the illusory perception of non-bodily
objects (e.g., artificial limbs) as being parts of one’s own body
and as being the source of the associated bodily sensations,
such as touch. For example, one can get to experience a man-
nequin’s hand as his/her own hand, and have strong physiological
responses when seeing it being attacked with a knife (Ehrsson
et al., 2007).
One of the earliest versions of this class of illusion was
reported by Tastevin (1937), who described how people could
perceive an artificial finger protruding from a cloth as their own
finger, when the latter was hidden from view. Sixty years later,
Botvinick and Cohen (1998) provided the first report of the rub-
ber hand illusion (RHI), in which healthy adults experience a
rubber hand as if it were their own hand. In this experimen-
tal setup, subjects have their hand concealed from view, while
they see a rubber hand of the same laterality, placed in a simi-
lar posture. The experimenter strokes both rubber and real hands
simultaneously, and after some time the majority of participants
report perceiving the touch as if coming from the rubber hand,
and the latter as being part of their own body (Figure 1D). In
addition, when asked to point blindly to the position of their left
hand, participants typically give proprioceptive estimations that
are shifted toward the rubber hand compared to their estimations
before the stimulation (e.g., Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris
and Haggard, 2005).
Apart from proprioceptive drifts, the RHI has been shown to
decrease the temperature and slow down the processing of tactile
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input from the real hand (Moseley et al., 2008; Hohwy and Paton,
2010) and to trigger the participants’ autonomic responses when
seeing the rubber hand under threat (e.g., Armel and Ramachan-
dran, 2003). Interestingly, it has been shown that brain areas
associated with anxiety and interoceptive awareness selectively
activate when, during the RHI, the fake limb is under threat and
at a similar level as when the real hand is threatened (Ehrsson
et al., 2007). Moreover, the subjective reports about the intensity
of the illusion, typically addressed through questionnaires, have
been shown to correlate positively with many of the objective
measures mentioned above—e.g., proprioceptive drifts (Longo
et al., 2008b), brain activity (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Limanowski
et al., 2013), and decrease in temperature of the real counterpart
(Moseley et al., 2008).
Beside correlated visuotactile cues, the RHI has been demon-
strated also under different multimodal stimuli. For example, the
illusion has been induced with correlated visual and motor infor-
mation, that is when participants are performing movements
with their unseen body part while seeing the fake counterpart
moving similarly (e.g., Dummer et al., 2009; Kalckert and Ehrs-
son, 2012, 2014a,b). In addition, just seeing the rubber hand at the
same position of the occluded real hand, that is in the mere pres-
ence of coincident visual and proprioceptive information, can
elicit the illusion of body ownership (Giummarra et al., 2010).
The illusions of body ownership have been also induced
toward full humanoid bodies, by using HMDs that permit see-
ing the fake body in the same spatial location as the real body
(Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Slater et al., 2010; Petkova et al.,
2011b; Maselli and Slater, 2013). These full body illusions were
induced through visuotactile (e.g., Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008),
visuomotor (e.g., Peck et al., 2013), and visuoproprioceptive
information (Maselli and Slater, 2014). Moreover, they were
shown to have physiological and proprioceptive correlates anal-
ogous to those of the RHI (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Llobera
et al., 2013; Maselli and Slater, 2013, 2014).
The induction of these illusions was shown even in the absence
of any visual input. In the so-called “somatic RHI,” blindfolded
participants have their left index finger passively moved by the
experimenter to touch a rubber hand, whereas the experimenter
synchronously touches their right hand. After some seconds of
correlated tactile and proprioceptive information, the partici-
pants typically report the illusion of touching their own hand,
instead of the rubber one (Ehrsson et al., 2005a). Although using
a different methodology, the somatic RHI was found to corre-
late selectively with enhanced activity in the premotor cortex, as
in the classic RHI and the full body ownership illusion (Ehrsson
et al., 2004, 2005a; Petkova et al., 2011a). This remarkable con-
vergence of results supports the view that body ownership is not
determined by the type of sensory triggers employed, but emerges
from the synergetic processing of the multimodal information
available at a specific time.
Extending the findings from other bodily illusions, body own-
ership illusions reveal that our brain dynamically computes
which are our own body parts on the basis of the available mul-
tisensory and sensorimotor information. Nevertheless, although
the numerous studies bring along a wealth of insights about the
multisensory mechanisms that underlie own-body perception,
little emphasis has been devoted to casting this information into a
coherent and comprehensive picture. In the following, we review
the literature on body ownership illusions with the aim of identi-
fying the multimodal triggers and constraints that govern them.
Given the different response variables used by different exper-
imenters, our criterion about the impact of the manipulation
of the experimental variable in eliciting the illusion is primarily
based on the most common measure, the subjective scores col-
lected through questionnaires. However, we also refer to other
objective measures especially in the cases where no question-
naires were administered. Moreover, given the extensive litera-
ture, we limit our scope to the body ownership illusions where
visual information was available.
Multimodal Triggers and Semantic
Constraints in Body Ownership Illusions
The elicitation of body ownership illusions (BOIs) has been
shown under different experimental setups that provide different
crossmodal stimuli (Figure 2). In this section, we present several
experimental studies on BOIs by classifying them in terms of the
main crossmodal stimuli provided (i.e., visual and tactile, visual
and proprioceptive, and visual and motor), or of the semantic
feature of the fake body that these have manipulated. With the
specific aim to highlight the principles that permit the induction
of BOIs, we investigate the importance of spatial and temporal
correspondence for each pair of crossmodal stimuli, as well as
the role of semantic information that the view of the non-bodily
objects brings along. To provide a link between the illusions of
body ownership and our normal sense of body ownership, for
each of considered the components we present a brief overview
of its known role in our own-body perception.
Visuotactile Triggers for Body Ownership
Illusions
Visuotactile Integration in Own-Body Perception
The experience of our own body is importantly shaped by visual
and somatosensory signals. One of the main contributions of
visuotactile integration concerns the information about contact
events between our body and the surrounding environment. For
example, when a fly lies on our hand, both vision and touch
inform the brain about the time and the location of the con-
tact. But even before the physical contact occurs, vision can
provide anticipatory information about where and when the
fly is probably going to land, which allows us to take actions
accordingly.
Beside its established role in determining the shape and tex-
ture of objects we explore with our hands (Ernst and Banks, 2002;
Lacey et al., 2010; van Beers et al., 2011; Helbig et al., 2012), visuo-
tactile integration is considered to be critical in perceiving our
body and the space nearby. This was first suggested by the dis-
covery of visuotactile neurons in the brain of monkeys: the visual
receptive fields of these cells extends outwards from the mapped
body part into the external space and shifts along with body
movement (Rizzolatti et al., 1981; Graziano and Gross, 1993;
Duhamel et al., 1998). Because of these properties, these bimodal
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FIGURE 2 | Different induction methods of Body Ownership Illusions
(BOIs). (A,D) Visuotactile triggers: the participant is watching the fake
hand/body placed in a plausible posture and being touched, while receiving
synchronous tactile stimulation in the real counterpart that remains out of view.
(B,E) Visuomotor triggers: the participant is performing movements with his
real hand/body that remains out of view, while watching the fake counterpart
moving synchronously. (C,F) Visuoproprioceptive triggers: the participant is
watching the fake hand/body placed in an overlapping position with the real
counterpart that remains out of view.
neurons were proposed to build an enlarged and flexible repre-
sentation of the space surrounding the body—the peripersonal
space—that mainly serves to guide our movements (Graziano
and Gross, 1994; Fogassi et al., 1996; Graziano and Cooke, 2006).
Homologous visuotactile populations have been identified in
the human brain with analogous properties and functionality
(Lloyd et al., 2003; Makin et al., 2007; Gentile et al., 2011; Sereno
and Huang, 2014). In addition, the importance of visuotactile
integration in the spatial representation of the body, has been
largely supported by behavioral studies (Spence et al., 2004).
Altogether, experimental evidence from monkey neurophysi-
ology to human behavior indicates the fundamental role of visuo-
tactile populations in flexibly defining the dynamics of our own
body spatial boundaries.
Methods and Apparatus for Visuotactile Stimulation
in BOIs
Turning to BOIs, the first report of the RHI was induced through
applying tactile stimuli on the occluded real hand and the visi-
ble fake counterpart (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). The procedure
was quickly established as a standard protocol and extended to
full BOIs as well (Figures 2A,D).
With respect to the employed methods, seen and felt touch
have been typically delivered manually by the experimenter (e.g.,
Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Armel and Ramachandran, 2003;
Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008). Alternative setups used cameras,
screens or virtual reality methods. By these technological means,
some experimenters manually stimulated only the real body (or
body part), whilst the participants watched a video stream of the
real body part being touched (e.g., Tsakiris et al., 2006) or a virtual
object touching an artificial body (or body part) seen in stereo
mode (e.g., Slater et al., 2008). Alternatively, computer-controled
administration of touchwas implemented by programming robot
arms or stepper motors that touched both the real and the fake
body (or body parts) (Tsakiris et al., 2008; Rohde et al., 2011), or
by attaching mechanical vibrators on the real body and program-
ming them to fire when the participants watched the virtual body
being touched through the HMD (Pabon et al., 2010; Evans and
Blanke, 2013; Maselli and Slater, 2013).
Spatial and Temporal Principles of Visuotactile
Integration as Trigger of BOIs
Systematic experimental evidence has shown that the RHI is
induced when the real hand and the fake counterpart are touched
at the same time and at homologous regions in hand-centered
coordinates. For example, when spatiotemporal mismatches were
introduced between the seen and felt touch, the RHI was sig-
nificantly inhibited (Armel and Ramachandran, 2003; Ehrsson
et al., 2004; Slater et al., 2008). Similar results were found for
full BOIs toward plastic mannequins seen from a 1 PP; partici-
pants perceived the mannequin’s body as their own body when
the real and the fake abdomen part were touched synchronously,
but not when asynchronously (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008). Nev-
ertheless, other studies have shown that when the fake body (or
body part) is realistic and has overlaps in space with the real body
counterpart, positive scores of ownership can be reported even in
presence of asynchronous visuotactile stimulation (Longo et al.,
2008a; Maselli and Slater, 2013).
A systematic study on the importance of temporal alignment
revealed that, when delays smaller than 300ms between the stim-
ulations were introduced, participants perceived the touch on
their hand as if caused by the stimulation applied to the rubber
hand, while for larger delays these illusory feelings were signif-
icantly attenuated (Shimada et al., 2009, 2014). In addition to
the temporal coupling, spatial congruence was also found to be
essential for the induction of the illusion. Stroking the rubber and
the real hands in temporal synchrony but at different locations
(e.g., index vs. little fingers, palm vs. forearm, or index vs. middle
finger) abolished the illusion (Kammers et al., 2009; Limanowski
et al., 2013; Riemer et al., 2014), demonstrating that temporal
matching alone is not sufficient for the RHI. Similar were the
findings on proprioceptive drifts when a spatial mismatch was
introduced between the seen and the felt synchronous strokes
(Costantini and Haggard, 2007).
Summary
Overall, the experimental results suggest that the induction
of BOIs depends critically on the spatiotemporal congruence
between the seen and the felt stimulation, which is a sufficient
condition to induce the illusions. However, the fact that BOIs
could occur in presence of visuotactile asynchronies when the
fake body is seen superimposed onto its real counterpart, indi-
cates that visuotactile correlations are not a necessary prerequi-
site for the illusion under such configuration.
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Visuomotor Triggers for Body Ownership
Illusions
Visuomotor Integration in Own-Body Perception
Our own-body perception is highly determined by our move-
ments since these provide information that facilitates self-other
distinction. For example, when a pianist plays the piano in a duet,
she uses—amongst others—her motor information together with
visual, tactile and proprioceptive feedback to recognize which of
the two right hands she sees is her own.
The experience of moving and acting in space involves an
extremely rich content of body related information that goes
far beyond the multisensory integration of two or more sen-
sory modalities. This can be better understood considering the
distinction between active vs. passive movements. In a passive
movement there is no motor intention: an externally generated
force displaces our body (body part) and consequently, a num-
ber of sensory information, including vision and proprioception,
are updated (Burke et al., 1988). In contrast, when we perform an
active movement, our brain generates and implements a motor
plan that relies on internal simulations of our motor system
(Wolpert et al., 1995): the motor plan is executed, monitored and
corrected by comparing the efference copy with the generated
sensory feedback (Miall and Wolpert, 1996; Todorov and Jor-
dan, 2002). The implication of internal body simulations renders
the processing of visuomotor cues during active movement much
richer in body-related information content. Indeed, this is sup-
ported by experimental evidence. For example, it was shown that
participants are better at discriminating synchronous vs. asyn-
chronous visuomotor cues when performing active movements
compared to passive (Shimada et al., 2010).
It is also relevant that visual monitoring and recognition
of one’s own actions has been proposed to contribute critically
to the sense of body ownership (Jeannerod, 2003), and to play
a major role in self-other discrimination (Jeannerod, 2004).
Developmental studies have shown that, at 4- to 5-months of
age, infants are already able to distinguish their limbs from
those of other babies on the basis of synchronous visuomotor
correlations: they can distinguish an online video stream of their
own moving limbs from similar videos of other babies, from
delayed videos of their own moving limbs, (Bahrick andWatson,
1985; Schmuckler, 1996), as well as from online videos in which
their body spatial configuration is seen modified (Rochat and
Morgan, 1995; Schmuckler, 1996).
A set of experimental studies has shown how healthy adults
rely on visuomotor stimuli to discriminate whether a seen mov-
ing hand is their own. For example, in the experiment of Daprati
and colleagues, participants were asked to perform a movement
while looking at a screen in which their filmed hand or the exper-
imenter’s was displayed in the same position of their occluded
hand. When asked to indicate whether the seen hand was their
own hand, participants’ performance showed a high rate of erro-
neous self-attribution when seeing the experimenter’s hand doing
the same movement (Daprati et al., 1997). In a similar setup,
participants saw a virtual hand moving as their own occluded
hand, under different spatial orientations and temporal delays.
When asked to decide whether the displayed movement cor-
responded to their own movement, subjects made significantly
more self-recognition errors for temporal delays smaller than
150ms and for angular deviations smaller than 15◦ (Franck et al.,
2001). A variation of the same setup was used to investigate
how action and visual cues about the body spatial configuration
are used in body-recognition processes (van den Bos and Jean-
nerod, 2002). Participants were presented with an online video
of their own hand and the hand of the experimenter performing
either the same, different or no movement at all, while displayed
simultaneously in different orientations. The results showed that
when the hands performed different movements, participants
were almost always able to recognize their own hand. In contrast,
when the visuomotor information was ambiguous (same move-
ments) participants were less accurate and their responses were
affected by the seen spatial configuration of the hands.
Overall, it becomes apparent that humans exploit the tight
coupling of visual andmotor signals not only for optimizing their
movement performance, but also for attributing their body parts
and body movements to themselves.
Methods and Apparatus for Visuomotor Stimulation
in BOIs
The induction of BOIs has been demonstrated in presence of
visuomotor stimulation instead of visuotactile. In those experi-
mental setups, the participants perform either active or passive
movements while seeing the artificial body (or body part) moving
(Figures 2B,E).
The animation of the fake body has been typically achieved
through mechanical devices that permitted linking the real and
the fake body parts, such as wooden rods (Kalckert and Ehrs-
son, 2012, 2014a), pulleys and strings (Azañón and Soto-Faraco,
2007), couplings (Walsh et al., 2011), pneumatically driven
plungers (Riemer et al., 2013, 2014), and braces (Dummer et al.,
2009). Alternative experimental setups used cameras to record
the participants’ moving hand and project it to a surface or a
screen (Tsakiris et al., 2006, 2010b). The intrinsic delays of the
apparatus are typically of the order of 70–100ms (Tsakiris et al.,
2006; Riemer et al., 2013, 2014), and thus below the threshold
of 150ms for detecting visuomotor delays (Franck et al., 2001;
Shimada et al., 2010). Other experimenters, using virtual real-
ity techniques, captured the participants’ movements—through
inertial systems and/or infrared cameras—and animated the vir-
tual limbs or bodies accordingly (Sanchez-Vives et al., 2010; Yuan
and Steed, 2010; Normand et al., 2011; Kilteni et al., 2012, 2013).
Spatial and Temporal Principles of Visuomotor
Integration as Trigger in BOIs
Several studies have demonstrated that BOIs are induced when
both real and fake bodies move homologous body parts at the
same time. This has been shown, for example, with fingers
(Tsakiris et al., 2006, 2010b; Sanchez-Vives et al., 2010; Walsh
et al., 2011; Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012, 2014a,b; Riemer et al.,
2013), hands (Dummer et al., 2009), arms (Yuan and Steed, 2010;
Normand et al., 2011; Kilteni et al., 2012; Llobera et al., 2013),
upper body (Kilteni et al., 2013), legs (Kokkinara and Slater,
2014), or full bodies (Banakou et al., 2013; Peck et al., 2013).
In contrast, when introducing temporal delays of the order of
500ms ormore (Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012, 2014a; Riemer et al.,
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2013, 2014), or whenmanipulating the seenmovements indepen-
dently from the real movement (Dummer et al., 2009; Sanchez-
Vives et al., 2010; Walsh et al., 2011; Banakou et al., 2013), the
corresponding illusions were inhibited. In addition to the tem-
poral coupling, moving homologous real and fake body parts
was also found to be essential for the induction of the illusion;
for example, moving the index finger while seeing the artificial
middle finger moving synchronously did not elicit the ownership
illusion (Riemer et al., 2014).
Summary
Similarly to visuotactile stimuli, the experimental results suggest
that the induction of BOIs depends critically on the spatiotempo-
ral congruence between the seen and the felt movements.
Visuoproprioceptive Modulations and Triggers
for Body Ownership Illusions
Visuoproprioceptive Integration in Own-Body
Perception
Our own-body perception is greatly influenced by visual and pro-
prioceptive information. The main contribution of visuoproprio-
ceptive integration relies on defining where our body is in space.
Bothmodalities inform the brain about where a specific body part
is located at a given point in time. For example, we can estimate
where our hand is with our eyes closed, and our judgement can
further be confirmed by looking at our own hand.
Experimental evidence has shown that when vision and pro-
prioception provide conflicting information, the perceived posi-
tion of our body parts can significantly deviate from the veridical
one. For example, when the hand is seen in a non-veridical loca-
tion through mirrors or prisms, subjects perceive their hand to
be in one single location, somewhere between the seen and the
felt position (Hay et al., 1965; Pick et al., 1969; Warren, 1980)
and closer to the visual one (van Beers et al., 1999). This visual
capture of proprioception has been shown to influence the per-
formance of reaching movements (Rossetti et al., 1995; Sober and
Sabes, 2003; Holmes et al., 2004) and to play a crucial role in
monitoring onlinemovement execution (Lajoie et al., 1992; Sober
and Sabes, 2003, 2005; Bagesteiro et al., 2006; Boulinguez and
Rouhana, 2008). Interestingly, a recent study with 5–7 years old
children has shown that the visual capture effects increase with
age, suggesting a progressive maturation of visuoproprioceptive
integration (Bremner et al., 2013).
Analogously to the visual capture of proprioception, it has
been shown that in absence of direct vision of the body, proprio-
ception can distort the perception of visual cues associated to the
body spatial configuration. For example, participants sitting in a
dark roomwhile holding a luminous target with their static hand,
report seeing the (static) luminous target moving in space when
experiencing the kinaesthetic illusion of moving their (static) arm
(Lackner and Levine, 1978). Similarly, moving the hand while
seeing its afterimage (Gregory et al., 1959) was shown to distort
the hand image or even to fade it out, despite that this should be
perceptually static on the sole basis of visual input (Davies, 1973).
Most studies on visuoproprioceptive populations have been
carried out in the context of reaching actions and motor control
in both monkeys (e.g., Battaglia-mayer et al., 2000) and humans
(e.g., Filimon et al., 2009). Nevertheless, neural populations have
been found in the monkey brain, which integrate static visual and
proprioceptive cues to encode the position of the arm (Graziano
et al., 2000). To our knowledge, no analogous studies have been
performed with humans.
Overall, experimental evidence suggests that visual and pro-
prioceptive information significantly contribute to the percep-
tion of our own body and more particularly, in determining its
perceived spatial configuration.
Methods and Apparatus for Visuoproprioceptive
Manipulations in BOIs
BOIs, including their full body versions, have been tested against
differences between the seen spatial configuration of the fake
body (or body part) and the one of the real body (or body part)
that is experienced through proprioception.
In its original version (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998), the RHI
was induced despite the spatial mismatch between the positions
of the real and the rubber hand. The same spatial arrange-
ment, with the rubber hand closer to the participants’ body mid-
line (Figure 2A), was quickly established as a standard protocol
for subsequent studies (e.g., Armel and Ramachandran, 2003;
Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Haans et al., 2008; Moseley et al.,
2008; Schütz-Bosbach et al., 2009). In other studies, the rubber
hand was instead placed above the occluded real one (e.g., Pavani
et al., 2000; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Azañón and Soto-Faraco, 2007;
Haggard and Jundi, 2009).
The above-mentioned studies used a physical object (i.e., the
rubber hand) and their setups therefore entail intrinsic limita-
tions in the possible manipulations of visuoproprioceptive stim-
uli; it is in fact never possible to have the two hands overlapping in
space without using devices. Different techniques including mir-
rors (e.g., Longo et al., 2008a; Zopf et al., 2010), cameras (e.g.,
Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Hohwy and Paton, 2010) and vir-
tual reality techniques (e.g., Perez-Marcos et al., 2012), permitted
experimenters to overcome this limitation by projecting the fake
body (body part) in complete overlap with its real counterparts.
Manipulations of the position and orientation of the fake body
(body parts) relatively to the real body, allowed experimenters
to investigate the extent to which visuoproprioceptive discrep-
ancies affect the induction and strength of BOIs. Furthermore,
it was possible to test whether close correspondence in the seen
and felt spatial configurations (i.e., apparent spatial coincidence)
can trigger BOIs without further crossmodal stimulation (e.g.,
visuotactile) (Figures 2C,F).
Visuoproprioceptive Modulations of BOIs
The case of visuotactile triggers
As long as the fake hand was placed close to the body midline
and thus within the reaching space, the RHI was induced in pres-
ence of spatiotemporally congruent visuotactile stimulation, for
several tested mismatches between the positions of the real and
fake hands in either the horizontal or the vertical plane; e.g., of
10–20 cm (e.g., Zopf et al., 2010; Rohde et al., 2011; Kalckert and
Ehrsson, 2014b), 20–40 cm (e.g., Ijsselsteijn et al., 2006; Haans
et al., 2008; Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2014b), or above 40 cm (e.g.,
Ehrsson et al., 2004; Zopf et al., 2010).
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With respect to the horizontal distance, no significant differ-
ences were found in the strength of the RHI under small (i.e.,
15 cm) or large (i.e., 45 cm) distances between the hands (Zopf
et al., 2010), suggesting that the between hands’ distance is not a
crucial factor. Different results have been found when the rubber
hand was placed farer away from the participant’s body midline
than the real one. In this case, increasing the horizontal dis-
tance between the two hands can eventually prevent the RHI
even when the rubber hand still lies within the reachable space
(Preston, 2013). This different effect of visuoproprioceptive mis-
match on the elicitation of the RHI can probably be explained
by our higher expectation of seeing our hand closer to the mid-
line than away from it. The between hands horizontal distance
was instead found to significantly affect subjective scores for con-
ditions of asynchronous visuotactile stroking (Zopf et al., 2010):
ownership scores were significantly higher when the two hands
were as close as 15 cm with respect to the case in which the dis-
tance was larger (45 cm). In her study Preston (2013) did not find
differences in questionnaire scores, which were equally low, inde-
pendently on the between hands distance. The different results
may be due to the different delays adopted in the asynchronous
condition (about 300ms and 1 s, respectively): in fact the delay
used by Zopf and colleagues was reported to mark the upper limit
for temporal discrepancies, above which the RHI is significantly
weakened (Shimada et al., 2009, 2014).
With respect to the vertical plane, no significant differences
in ownership scores were detected between placing the real and
the fake hands at a vertical distance of 12 or 27.5 cm, though
keeping both at the same horizontal position close to the partici-
pants’ midline. However, increasing the vertical distance between
the hands to 43 cm was found to significantly attenuate the RHI
scores (Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2014b).
While in all the above-mentioned studies the real and fake
hands differed in position but were mostly aligned in terms of
orientation, other experiments have shown that BOIs can be
induced in presence of an additional mismatch in orientation,
provided that the fake body (body part) was seen in an anatom-
ically plausible posture. For example, rotating the fake left hand
by 44◦ clockwise did not prevent participants from experiencing
the physical touch as if coming from the position of the rubber
one, and further led to a recalibration of their perceived elbow
joint angle (Butz et al., 2014). BOIs were experienced also when
the seen fake hand, rotated away from the real one, crossed the
body midline (Brozzoli et al., 2012; Perez-Marcos et al., 2012);
but see (Costantini and Haggard, 2007; Cadieux et al., 2011) for
effects in proprioceptive drifts. In addition, the RHI was induced
toward a rubber hand placed palm-up when the fake palm was
stroked synchronously with the palm of the real that was placed
palm-down (Ionta et al., 2013). Moreover, by exploring different
orientation mismatches, a recent study reported that tactile sen-
sations were perceived to arise from the rubber mainly for those
rotations that are easy to mimic with the real. Interestingly, the
illusion onsets were found to be shorter when there were no ori-
entation mismatches, without though any significant differences
in the subjective reports (Ide, 2013). Instead, when discrepancies
in both position and orientation were introduced by moving the
rubber hand away from the participants’ midline and rotating it,
illusory tactile sensations were reported to gradually decrease in
intensity with effects also in illusion onsets (Lloyd, 2007).
Consistent with these are the findings from full BOIs. These
have been typically induced toward artificial bodies that appeared
as if spatially coincident with the real ones, seen therefore from
a 1 PP, and under spatiotemporally congruent visuotactile stim-
ulation (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Slater et al., 2010; Petkova
et al., 2011b; Maselli and Slater, 2013). With respect to position, a
recent study showed that a full BOI could be experienced toward
a virtual body seen from a laterally shifted visual perspective (by
about 25 cm), i.e., with the virtual body overlapping only partially
with the real one, upon congruent visuotactile stimulation.When
compared to a condition when the fake body was in complete
overlap with the real one, no significant differences in ownership
were detected (Maselli and Slater, 2014). Analogously for ori-
entation, the illusion was induced when the mannequin’s body
was seen from a 1 PP but tilted upwards by 30◦ approximately
(Petkova et al., 2011a).
The case of visuomotor triggers
Beside the information about the movement timings and the
involved body parts, visuomotor stimuli provide information on
how the relative position and orientation of the real and fake bod-
ies change in time. Some of the studies that employed visuomotor
stimulation of artificial body parts followed the RHI protocol and
presented the artificial limb close to the midline and lateral to
the real one, e.g., at a distance of 15–20 cm (e.g., Sanchez-Vives
et al., 2010; Riemer et al., 2013, 2014) while others placed the fake
limb above the real one at a vertical distance of about 12 cm (e.g.,
Walsh et al., 2011; Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012, 2014a,b). With
respect to the horizontal distance, no significant differences were
found in the subjective reports of body ownership when the fake
and the real limb moved synchronously while keeping a distance
of about 10 cm, compared to when these were spatially coinci-
dent (Yuan and Steed, 2010). Nevertheless, larger distances were
not tested. With respect to the vertical distance, a recent study
revealed that small distances (i.e., 12 cm) permitted the induc-
tion of a robust RHI through congruent visuomotor stimulation
while larger distances (i.e., 27.5 or 43 cm) significantly attenuated
the subjective scores (Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2014b).
Visuoproprioceptive Integration as Trigger for BOIs
The fact that full BOIs were found to occur when having a
static view of a highly realistic spatially coincident virtual body
and under asynchronous visuotactile stimulation, suggests that
congruent visuoproprioceptive cues alone could be sufficient to
induce the illusion and further to sustain it under visuotactile
discrepancies (Maselli and Slater, 2013). In partial agreement are
findings from the RHI where participants seeing the rubber hand
through a mirror, as if spatially coincident with their real one, did
not disagree with statements of ownership when the visuotactile
stimulation was asynchronous (Longo et al., 2008a).
In contrast to the large number of studies using visuotactile
triggers, there have been fewer that explored whether spatial con-
gruency of visuoproprioceptive cues can be by itself sufficient
for the induction of BOIs. These studies, in which BOIs were
assessed in “vision only” conditions, suggest that when there is
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neither visuotactile nor visuomotor stimulation the relative posi-
tion and alignment of the real and fake body (body part) matters.
When seeing through a mirror a rubber hand in the same posi-
tion and orientation as the real one, participants gave positive
scores for the illusion of ownership (Longo et al., 2008a; Gium-
marra et al., 2010). Nevertheless, upon direct comparison, addi-
tional synchronous visuotactile stroking elicited a significantly
stronger illusion (Longo et al., 2008a). In contrast, when the fake
and real hands were not spatially coincident, the mere vision of
the rubber hand was not sufficient for inducing the illusion (as
from participants’ self-reports) (Rohde et al., 2011). In line with
this overall evidence, it was shown that the visual exposure to a
realistic spatially coincident virtual body by itself, can induce a
full BOI (as reported in post experiment debriefing) (Maselli and
Slater, 2014).
Summary
These findings reveal that spatial congruency of visuopropriocep-
tive cues (i.e., spatial coincidence) is not necessary for the illusion
of body ownership to emerge, provided that the fake body (body
part) is seen in an anatomical plausible configuration and in pres-
ence of congruent visuotactile or visuomotor stimulation. How-
ever, different degrees of visuoproprioceptive spatial mismatch
significantly modulate both the intensity and the time onset of
the illusion.
On the other hand, spatial coincidence may be a sufficient
condition for eliciting BOIs. Although there is consensus in the
literature that congruent visuotactile and visuomotor stimula-
tion is necessary for inducing BOIs, this may specifically apply
to conditions that include visuoproprioceptive mismatches.
Semantic Constraints in Body Ownership
Illusions
Semantic Constraints in Own-Body Perception
Beside the continuously updated sensory and motor informa-
tion, our own-body perception largely relies upon higher-order,
cognitive processes. Our semantic memories and knowledge con-
tribute in shaping an abstract body model that contains infor-
mation about the general and not self-specific visual, postural
and structural properties of the human body. For example, we
know how the human body is structured (e.g., the body has two
hands), as well as how many degrees of freedom it has when it
moves.
Given their non-self-specific nature, these cognitive processes
depend, to an important extent, on neural mechanisms and brain
areas that evolved for the visual perception of others’ human bod-
ies. Apart from brain areas specifically devoted to face perception
(Haxby et al., 2000), several specialized regions for visual pro-
cessing of bodies have been found in humans and non-human
primates. This applies to hands, bodies (with and without heads),
and to anatomically plausible body postures and motion (Peelen
and Downing, 2007). Research in infants has shown that these
selective areas are already functional at few days/months (Gliga
and Dehaene-Lambertz, 2005; Hirai and Hiraki, 2005; Reid et al.,
2006; Simion et al., 2008), suggesting that we are born equipped
with structures for the visual encoding of body parts and human
body kinematics.
Moving the focus away from own-body perception for a
moment, semantic information has been proposed to be an
important feature of multisensory integration. When consider-
ing two or more crossmodal stimuli, semantic congruence refers
to their “close correspondence of content” (Doehrmann and
Naumer, 2008). For example, a visual stimulus showing a dog is
semantically congruent with a barking but not with a meowing
sound (Alais et al., 2010). In this case, the semantic congruence
of the audiovisual stimuli speaks in favor of a common underly-
ing cause: a dog. Several studies have shown that the integration
of crossmodal stimuli is enhanced when these are semantically
congruent (Doehrmann and Naumer, 2008).
The relevance of semantic congruence in the context of own-
body perception has been demonstrated in non-human primates
with the seminal work of Graziano et al. (2000). The authors
showed that the activity of visuoproprioceptive neurons in the
monkey brain is importantly modulated by the semantic con-
tent of the visual stimulus. Single cell activity was recorded while
manipulating the position of the occluded monkey’s arm, and
that of a seen object. The object was either a replica of the arm or
another object, such as a white paper or an apple’s slice. The activ-
ity of the neurons was significantly modulated by the position of
the arm replica, if the latter was in an anatomically plausible con-
figuration. In contrast, changing the position of the white paper,
or of the apple slice, had no effect. Interestingly, if the arm replica
was seen in non-anatomically plausible configurations, i.e., with
opposite handedness or rotated by 180◦ so that the fake fingers
were pointing to the chest, the observed activity was no longer
affected by the fake arm’s position (Graziano et al., 2000).
Altogether, experimental evidence suggests that our brain is
equipped with highly specialized structures for the visual process-
ing of body parts and, in order to be effectively integrated with
the somatosensory signals, visual cues should not only resemble
body parts but further satisfy body semantic constraints in terms
of anatomical plausibility of posture and structure.
Semantic Constraints in BOIs
In the particular context of BOIs, the level of semantic congru-
ence refers to which extent the non-corporeal object resembles
a not self-specific human body (body part) in terms of shape,
anatomy and structure. We first distinguish between objects with
human body shape or not (Figures 3A,B). If the objects are body-
shaped, their semantic information can be further characterized
by their texture, the anatomical plausibility of their spatial config-
uration and the anatomical plausibility of their internal structure
(Figures 3C–E).
The Role of Shape
Converging experimental evidence suggests that BOIs are shape-
sensitive. For example, when a checkerboard (Zopf et al., 2010)
was used instead of a rubber hand, the reports of the illusion
were weaker if not entirely absent. Analogous inhibition in sub-
jective reports was found for non-body shaped objects with hand-
like skin texture (Haans et al., 2008) or size (Hohwy and Paton,
2010, experiment 3). Similar inhibitory effects were also detected
for proprioceptive drifts when using a stick instead of a rub-
ber hand (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005). Analogously, full BOIs
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FIGURE 3 | Examples of objects with different semantic information.
(A) Objects with non-human body shape. (B) Objects with human body
shape. (C) Objects with non-human skin texture (D) Objects (blue) in
anatomically implausible spatial configurations with respect to the participant’s
body (red). (E) Objects (blue) with anatomically implausible structure with
respect to the human body.
were suppressed when participants had a 1 PP view of a rectan-
gular body-sized object instead of a 1 PP view of a mannequin
(Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008). Furthermore, even smaller viola-
tions of shape were shown to have an effect; in the study of
Tsakiris et al. (2010a) the RHI was reported only for the rubber
hand and not for other objects, including a wooden block with
sculpted wrist and fingers.
The results reported in the study of Armel and Ramachan-
dran (2003) are somewhat in disagreement with these findings:
stroking a table surface synchronously with the participants’ hid-
den hand induced weak ownership sensations toward the table,
though significantly higher in intensity compared to the control
condition in which the real hand was visible. Despite this, sub-
jective scores for the “table ownership” were significantly lower
with respect to when a rubber hand was used–a condition that
always preceded the table one. Motivated by this point, the study
of Hohwy and Paton (2010) showed that while the mere syn-
chronous visuotactile stimulation of a piece of hand-sized card-
board was not sufficient to induce the illusion (experiment 3),
prior induction of the illusion (by using a rubber hand) could
instead allow the illusion to be sustained and projected on the
cardboard when the rubber hand was instantaneously replaced
by it (experiment 2).
These results suggest that whereas BOIs are critically sensitive
to shape, a prior exposure to the illusion can modulate this sen-
sitivity by overriding the contribution of prior knowledge about
the shape of human bodies to the illusion itself.
The Role of Texture Realism
Semantic information related to the realism of the fake body
(body part) has been investigated through modifying its seen
material texture. The realism of the seen texture is associated
with the degree of the perceived biological plausibility of the seen
object as a candidate for a human body part. Texture realism
has been shown not to be crucial for BOIs; yet, modulations in
the intensity of the illusion have been found when manipulat-
ing the texture. For example, the RHI has been elicited toward
a fake hand wearing a latex glove, though at a significantly lesser
intensity compared to when the realistically textured rubber hand
was used (Haans et al., 2008). Similarly, a mechanical hand-
shaped object made of wires, permitted the induction of the RHI
through congruent visuotactile stimulation, albeit to a signifi-
cantly lesser extent compared to when a realistic replica of a
human hand was used (Bertamini and O’Sullivan, 2014). Turn-
ing to full BOIs, texture realism was proposed to have a modu-
latory effect when proving visuotactile stimulation (Maselli and
Slater, 2013): whilst congruent visuotactile triggers were found
to be necessary in eliciting the full BOI toward a spatially coin-
cident plastic mannequin (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Petkova
et al., 2011b), using a realistically textured virtual body produced
negligible differences between congruent and incongruent visuo-
tactile stimulations (Maselli and Slater, 2013). Nevertheless, con-
gruent visuomotor stimulation with a spatially coincident virtual
body having an unnatural purple skin color induced the illusion,
without significant differences in strength compared to when a
realistic skin texture was used (Peck et al., 2013). This last result
suggests that visuomotor correlations may tend to saturate the
illusion, so that modulations by texture become negligible.
The Role of Anatomical Plausibility of Spatial
Configuration and of Visual Perspective
The anatomical plausibility of the spatial configuration of the fake
body was shown to play a critical role in the induction of BOIs.
For example, rotating the rubber hand by 180◦ (with the rub-
ber fingers pointing toward the participant) prevented the RHI,
despite congruent visuotactile (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Holle et al.,
2011) or visuomotor (Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012) stimulation.
Analogously, a 90◦ rotation of a left rubber hand (with the rubber
fingers pointing to the left) was shown to reduce the difference
in proprioceptive drifts between synchronous and asynchronous
visuotactile stimulation (Tsakiris andHaggard, 2005) and to delay
the onset of the RHI (Aimola Davies et al., 2013). A system-
atic study in which different rotations were applied on the rub-
ber hand, including both anatomically plausible and implausible
configurations, has shown that illusory experiences were elicited
mainly for anatomically plausible configurations (Ide, 2013).
Apart from violating constraints of human joints articula-
tion, the plausibility of the body spatial configuration can be
broken also by manipulating the visual perspective on the fake
body or body part. For example, seeing directly one’s own body
from a distance is anatomically impossible. Similar to findings
from the RHI, having a 3 PP over a distant virtual body or a
mannequin was found to inhibit the illusion, despite congruent
visuotactile stimulation between the real and the fake body. Upon
direct comparison of 1 PP and 3 PP conditions, this inhibition
was consistently found for different distances at which the fake
body was seen: 100 cm (Slater et al., 2010), 80 cm (Maselli and
Slater, 2013), 75 cm (Petkova et al., 2011b), and 40 cm (Maselli
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and Slater, 2014). In contrast, when the visual perspective was
slightly shifted from the eyes of the virtual body, but still con-
sistent with an anatomically plausible view of the own body, the
full BOI was induced (Maselli and Slater, 2014). These results are
consistent with evidence from RHI experiments that have shown
an inhibition of the illusion for rubber hands placed beyond the
reaching space. These, as well as other configurations, e.g., the
fake hand rotated 180◦, could be regarded as cases of having a
3 PP over the fake limb. Interestingly, Bertamini and colleagues
induced a vivid RHI providing exclusively a 3 PP view of the
rubber hand through amirror (Bertamini et al., 2011). The appar-
ent disagreement between this result and the findings mentioned
above could be explained by the fact that the 3 PP view was pro-
vided through a mirror, and considering that we automatically
attribute visual information from the mirror to the physical loca-
tion of the reflected objects. Indeed, the critical role of the mir-
ror in mediating the visual perspective was confirmed within the
same study: the RHI was abolished when providing exactly the
same visual information about the rubber hand and visuotactile
stimulation, but without an intervening mirror.
The Role of Anatomical Plausibility of Structure
The impact of anatomical plausibility of the structure of the seen
object has been shown to vary importantly depending on the
specific manipulation. For example, full BOIs have been shown
toward artificial bodies of a significantly different scale from the
real ones (van der Hoort et al., 2011; Banakou et al., 2013). With
respect to the volume of the artificial body (body part), several
studies have successfully elicited BOIs toward two dimensional
video projections of either the real or the rubber hand (Ijsselsteijn
et al., 2006; Tsakiris et al., 2006; Shimada et al., 2009) or toward
a normal-sized hand of non-biological texture and of reduced
volume (Bertamini and O’Sullivan, 2014), although the illusion
was found to be stronger when the fake body part was seen with
normal volumetric characteristics (Ijsselsteijn et al., 2006). Con-
cerning body connectivity, subjective scores of ownership toward
a virtual hand were significantly stronger when this was seen
to be connected to the virtual torso rather than disconnected
(Perez-Marcos et al., 2012).
With respect to body proportions, several studies that manip-
ulated the seen hands to be either smaller or larger than the
average population size, revealed various effects, including weight
and size perception (e.g., Haggard and Jundi, 2009; Bruno and
Bertamini, 2010; Linkenauger et al., 2013), distance perception
(e.g., Linkenauger et al., in press), and movement kinematics
(e.g., Bernardi et al., 2013). When studying the particular effect
of hand size on eliciting the RHI, high illusion scores without sig-
nificant differences were reported when using either a small (e.g.,
hand size of a primary school child) or a large (e.g., hand size of
a tall man) rubber hand (Heed et al., 2011). Similarly, no signifi-
cant differences in the illusion scores were detected when using a
two dimensional hand image that was either equal in size, magni-
fied or shrunk by 3 cm with respect to the participants’ real hand
(Pavani and Zampini, 2007). Similarly, the RHI was elicited with
a small and a large rubber hand, still within the range of anatomi-
cally plausible body structures (Bruno and Bertamini, 2010). In
contrast, using artificial body parts that violated normal body
proportions, as for example a fake arm 91 cm beyond the real one,
was shown to elicit weaker feelings of ownership through congru-
ent visuotactile stimulation, compared to when the fake arm was
seen with a plausible length (Armel and Ramachandran, 2003).
When providing both visuotactile and visuomotor stimulation,
participants gave high scores of ownership over a virtual arm up
to three times the length of the real one, but less strongly at four
times the length (Kilteni et al., 2012).
A similar effect was found when manipulating the number of
artificial body parts. For example, stroking a rubber hand syn-
chronously with the participants’ visible hand (Guterstam et al.,
2011), or stroking two rubber hands placed side-by-side syn-
chronously with the participants’ occluded real hand (Ehrsson,
2009), was shown to induce the illusion of having multiple limbs
or owning two hands of the same laterality at the same time,
respectively. Nevertheless, in both cases the experienced owner-
ship was stronger when employing the classic RHI setup. With
respect to simultaneous ownership toward two rubber hands of
the same laterality, it was shown that these need to be placed sym-
metrically with respect to the real limb (Folegatti et al., 2012).
High illusion scores concerning having two limbs were further
reported when participants were moving their hand while seeing
two video replicas, projected symmetrically with respect to the
real, moving accordingly (Newport et al., 2010).
The spatial arrangement of the artificial body part with respect
to the participant’s body was instead demonstrated to be criti-
cal. For example, seeing a right rubber foot being stroked syn-
chronously with the participants’ right hand did not induce
ownership feelings (Guterstam et al., 2011). Analogously, no sig-
nificant differences were found in proprioceptive drifts when
comparing synchronous and asynchronous stimulation applied
on a right rubber hand and the participants’ left hand (Tsakiris
and Haggard, 2005).
The Role of Stimulation Congruence
Another aspect of semantic congruence concerns the compati-
bility of the seen and felts touch when inducing BOIs through
visuotactile stimulation. In the majority of studies, the instru-
ment seen to administer the touch on the artificial body was
the same—e.g., paintbrushes (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998), sharp
pins (Capelari et al., 2009), rods (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008)—or
a visually compatible one, with the one used to deliver the touch
on the real body (Slater et al., 2008; Pabon et al., 2010; Normand
et al., 2011;Maselli and Slater, 2013). Nevertheless, using different
instruments could inhibit the occurrence of the BOI by violating
the participants’ tactile expectancies: the participant who sees the
fake body being touched by a soft texture material, would expect
sensations of analogous quality on his/her real body. This was
investigated by using a piece of cotton to stimulate the rubber
hand while using a piece of sponge to stimulate the real hand or
vice versa. Results from both proprioceptive drifts and question-
naires were not significantly different from the case in which the
same instrument was used (Schütz-Bosbach et al., 2009).
Summary
Experimental evidence suggests that BOIs are greatly affected by
the semantic information the visual cues of the fake body bring
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along, at least in terms of their shape, the anatomical plausibility
of their spatial configuration and structure. Even if some forms
of anatomical violations (e.g., larger or smaller bodies, longer
or multiple limbs) can be tolerated and overcome by congru-
ent multimodal stimulation, other forms of violation (e.g., spatial
arrangement) may not. This suggests that, in order to be per-
ceived as parts of the own body, fake objects need to satisfy to
some extent semantic constraints from an abstract and not self-
specific body model (Tsakiris et al., 2007; Longo et al., 2009;
Tsakiris, 2010). Yet, the exact boundaries of tolerable violations
are still to be determined.
Theoretical Accounts for Induction of Body
Ownership Illusions
The studies on BOIs that we have reviewed so far provide impor-
tant insights on the contribution of multisensory signals and
semantic knowledge on the emergence of our sense of body own-
ership. However, in order to gain a deeper understanding on how
the brain infers which is our body and its limbs, it is necessary
to understand why BOIs are induced at all. Although there is
extensive consensus in the literature that multisensory process-
ing of bodily signals underlies the induction of BOIs (Graziano
and Botvinick, 2002; Makin et al., 2008; Tsakiris, 2010; Ehrsson,
2011; Maselli and Slater, 2013), very few researchers attempted to
cast the experimental conclusions into a unitary framework.
The initial Botvinick and Cohen’s proposal was that the RHI
arises from the three-way interaction between vision, touch
and proprioception (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). This idea was
reflected in the proposal ofMakin et al. (2008). According to their
model, visual and proprioceptive cues about the positions of the
real and rubber hands are first combined into a single estimate
of the hand’s spatial configuration; following, visual and tactile
information about the seen and felt touches are processed in the
common reference frame of the hand and, if integrated, elicit the
illusion. This proposal was extended to account for experimental
findings on the contribution of semantic information. According
to the model proposed by Tsakiris (2010), the integration of
multisensory cues is gated by semantic information in terms of
the shape and anatomical plausibility of the seen object; only
those objects that fit a pre-existing internal model of the human
body can be therefore experienced as parts of the own body.
In his account, Tsakiris proposed that this “test-for-fit” process
takes place in the right temporo-parietal junction (Tsakiris et al.,
2008). Alternatively, it was suggested that this selection process
might be operated by visuoproprioceptive populations (Maselli
and Slater, 2013).
Although these models offer a schematic description of the
induction of BOIs, by referring also to candidate brain areas that
operate the multisensory integration and the semantic gating,
they do not explain what is the underlying computational prob-
lem, and how our brain solves it with the resulting illusory experi-
ence. In the following, we briefly review recent predictive coding
accounts that propose a specific computational framework for
the study of self-processing, including the sense of body owner-
ship. Subsequently, we focus on two alternative computational
accounts, namely the Bayesian causal inference models and the
connectionist models. Both approaches have been developed to
explain various multisensory perceptual phenomena and they
could be adopted and extended in future works to address the
problem of BOIs.
Predictive Coding Approaches
In a recent stream of work (Hohwy, 2007; Apps and Tsakiris,
2013; Clark, 2013; Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013; Seth,
2013), the problem underpinning self-processing and self-
recognition has been approached within the general framework
of hierarchical generative models, such as predictive coding
(Srinivasan et al., 1982; Rao and Ballard, 1999) and the free-
energy principle (e.g., Friston, 2009). These models adopt the
view, originally put forward by Von Helmholtz (Hatfield, 1990),
that the brain needs to infer the hidden causes of the sensory
signals; for example, the existence of a dog when hearing barking-
like sound. It does so, by minimizing the error between the pre-
dictions it makes about the expected cues based on its internal
causal model (e.g., what would be the auditory stimulus associ-
ated with a dog) and the available sensory information (e.g., the
heard barking sound).
In this context it has been proposed that the RHI results from
minimizing the prediction errors that arise from feeling the touch
on the real hand and seeing the touch at a different location (i.e.,
on the rubber hand), as well as the errors concerning the rubber
hand not looking exactly as the real hand. Error minimization
would thus result in merging the spatial representation of the two
hands and further in updating prior beliefs about one’s own hand
appearance (Apps and Tsakiris, 2013; Seth, 2013). Interestingly,
several findings from RHI studies can be explained as the effect
of strategies for error minimization; this is the case of the atten-
uation of somatosensory processing in the real hand, like e.g.,
the slowing of tactile temporal processing (Moseley et al., 2008),
the increase of tactile detection threshold (Zopf et al., 2011), and
the reduction of primary somatosensory cortex responses to tac-
tile stimuli (Zeller et al., 2014). Since the main source of errors
arises from the spatial discrepancies between the visual position
of the rubber hand and the position of the real one provided by
somatosensation, decreasing the precision of the latter could con-
stitute an effective strategy to minimize the error (Zeller et al.,
2014).
Despite the insights that these models provide about possible
neurobiological mechanisms underlying BOIs, to date these pro-
posals have been formulatedmainly at a conceptual level, without
tackling the underlying computational problem.
Causal Inference in Multimodal Cue Integration
under BOIs
In contrast to predictive coding accounts, Bayesian causal infer-
ence models offer a simpler and comprehensive computational
account for multisensory phenomena, usually without address-
ing the neurobiological mechanisms. According to these mod-
els, when people are presented with two stimuli from different
modalities, they initially infer whether these have the same ori-
gin (i.e., cause) or not, and then they combine their information
according to these beliefs (Körding et al., 2007). For example,
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when we hear a barking sound and we see a dog close to the audi-
tory source, we will be confident that the barking sound comes
from the seen dog and we will therefore use both the visual and
the auditory information to estimate the position of the dog. In
contrast, when the sound is perceived to come from a very dis-
tinct position with respect to the position of the seen dog, we
may consider the existence of two dogs as more likely. Causal
inference models were shown to explain various phenomena in
multisensory perception (Shams and Beierholm, 2010), including
the spatial (Körding et al., 2007;Wozny et al., 2010) and temporal
(Shams et al., 2005) ventriloquist effects, and visuomotor adapta-
tion (Körding and Tenenbaum, 2006; Wei and Körding, 2009).
While these models have been typically used to describe the
combination of two sensory cues, analogous ideas could be
applied to explain the induction of BOIs. Indeed, Armel and
Ramachandran (2003) proposed that the RHI is induced due to
a Bayesian perceptual learning driven by the high likelihood of
the visual and tactile stimuli to occur from one common event. In
other words, it is more likely that the seen touch and the felt touch
belong to the same event (i.e., my hand being stroked), than the
existence of one artificial hand that is stroked synchronously with
my hidden hand. Due to the fact that their proposal was exclu-
sively based on the likelihood of sensory data, it was quickly put
aside by other authors, as it was unable to explain the inhibition
of the illusion under semantic violations (Tsakiris and Haggard,
2005; Tsakiris, 2010).
Nevertheless, a Bayesian model that includes semantic influ-
ences can be used to address the induction of RHI. For example,
using the causal inference framework, the computational prob-
lem the brain needs to solve refers to inferring whether there is a
common cause (i.e., my hand) or two different causes (i.e., my
hand and the rubber one) generating the available visual, tac-
tile, and proprioceptive signals (Figure 4). Mathematically for-
malizing the problem, the nervous system needs to calculate the
probability of there being one hand (C = 1) vs. there being two
hands (C = 2), given the available sensory information and prior
knowledge. At time τ, the sensory data consist of the static visual
(xV) and proprioceptive (xP) spatial configuration of the real
and rubber hands, the semantic information of the seen object
mv, and the trains of tactile stimuli applied, up to the current
moment τ, on the rubber (s→τV ) and the real (s
→τ
T ), respectively
(Equation 1).
p(C = 1 | mV, xV, xP, s
→τ
V , s
→τ
T )
=
p(mV, xV, xP, s
→τ
V , s
→τ
T | C = 1)p(C = 1)
p(mV, xV, xP, s
→τ
V , s
→τ
T )
(1)
Under the simplifying assumption that the visual, tactile and
proprioceptive information are conditionally independent, the
problem can then be formulized as:
p
(
C = 1 | mV, xV, xP, s
→τ
V , s
→τ
T
)
=
p
(
mV | C = 1)p(xV, xP | C = 1)p(s
→τ
V , s
→τ
T | C = 1
)
p (C = 1)
p
(
mv, xV, xP, s
→τ
V , s
→τ
T
) (2)
The model described by Equations (1) and (2) states that the
probability for a single hand existing, estimated at time τ given
the sensory evidence, depends on the likelihood of the evidence
given only one hand—p
(
mV, xV, xP, s
→τ
V , s
→τ
T | C = 1
)
—and on
the prior expectation for only one hand being there —p (C = 1).
The likelihood of the data depends on (i) the distance between the
two hands, i.e., p(xV, xP | C = 1), (ii) the spatiotemporal discrep-
ancies of the visuotactile stimulation, i.e., p(s→τV , s
→τ
T | C = 1),
and (iii) the level of semantic congruence between the seen hand
and the real one, i.e., p (mV | C = 1). These visuopropriocep-
tive, visuotactile, and semantic factors contribute to the likeli-
hood by increasing it in proportion to the congruency of the
correspondent stimuli1. The likelihood, in turn, is in continuous
interplay with prior expectations (e.g., the position of the limbs
close to the body midline, personality traits including suggestibil-
ity to illusory perceptions, previous experience of the illusion), to
update the posterior probability of only one hand being respon-
sible for the sensory inputs, p
(
C = 1 | mV, xV, xP, s
→τ
V , s
→τ
T
)
.
The illusion is then experienced when this posterior probability
exceeds a given threshold (Wozny et al., 2010).
This relatively simple model, at least qualitatively, can accom-
modatemany of the experimental findings on the RHI. For exam-
ple, when the rubber hand is placed close to the real hand and
without violating anatomical constraints, spatiotemporally con-
gruent visuotactile stimulation will accumulate evidence in favor
of a common hand being the source of all sensations and would
induce the illusion (e.g., Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). The pro-
gressive convergence of the model to a common hand scenario
is also supported by experimental evidence that the RHI is not
immediate but needs time to be elicited (Peled et al., 2000; Ehrs-
son et al., 2004; Perez-Marcos et al., 2012). On the other hand,
when the visuotactile stimulation is asynchronous (e.g., Botvinick
and Cohen, 1998; Armel and Ramachandran, 2003) or spatially
incongruent (e.g., Kammers et al., 2009), the evidence will favor
the existence of two hands, and the illusion will not be induced. In
addition, semantic violations in terms of shape, anatomical plau-
sibility and realism will render the contribution of the likelihood
less important and therefore, the induction of the illusion more
difficult, and its resulting strength weaker (Armel and Ramachan-
dran, 2003; Haans et al., 2008; Ehrsson, 2009; Ide, 2013). More-
over, placing the rubber hand far from the real one and from the
participant’s midline corresponds to decreasing both the likeli-
hood of visuoproprioceptive signals and the prior probability of
the limb’s position (Lloyd, 2007; Preston, 2013). Finally, when the
two hands are overlapping or close in space, the high likelihood of
visuoproprioceptive information can render the contribution of
the visuotactile likelihood unnecessary (Giummarra et al., 2010)
or less relevant (Zopf et al., 2010).
This formulation of the problem could be further extended to
dynamically include the effects of having experienced the illu-
sion at a given time, on the (prior) expectation for the illusion
to occur at following times, as well as on the way the brain pro-
cesses the incoming sensory signals (likelihood) later on. Com-
putationally this could be done by adopting an iterative approach
in which both the prior expectation and the probability densi-
ties representing the likelihoods at a given time step, evolve over
1The probability distribution functions in Equation (2) can be for example approx-
imated as normal distributions in the correspondent metric.
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FIGURE 4 | A causal inference model for the classic version of the
RHI. Left: one cause being responsible for all cues. In this case, the
visually perceived configuration xV, the proprioceptive perceived
configuration xP, the seen strokes s
→τ
V and the felt strokes s
→τ
T together
with the seen morphological characteristics mV, are mapped into a
common cause (C = 1). Right: alternatively, two distinct causes may be
inferred, decoupling the problem into two independent estimation
problems. The brain infers whether the seen and felt spatial
configurations, the tactile events and the seen morphology origin from the
same causal structure, i.e., my hand (C = 1), or independent causal
structures, i.e., the real and the rubber hands (C = 2), and then derives
optimal predictions from this.
time as a function of the posterior probability. Such an exten-
sion of the model could account for several aftereffects reported
in the literature. In Hohwy and Paton (2010), for example, it was
reported that if, after a period of congruent visuotactile stimula-
tion in which the illusion is established, the stimulation switches
to incongruent patterns (e.g., seeing elevated stroking on the rub-
ber hand while receiving physical touch) then participants would
keep experiencing the illusion together with unusual perceptual
sensations (e.g., supernaturally caused tactile sensations). These
results can indeed be explained by the fact that having experi-
enced the illusion enhances the expectation for the illusion to be
there (increasing the prior probability) and, at the same time, this
modulates the probability densities of the likelihoods involved
(p(s→τV , s
→τ
T | C = 1) in this case), e.g., increasing the vari-
ance, so to “explain away” the ongoing illusion and suppress
the sensory conflict. This formulation is conceptually analogous
to minimizing prediction errors in predictive coding approaches
and, as discussed in the previous section, can account for several
after-effects of the illusion, e.g., the attenuation of the somatosen-
sory processing on the real hand (see the previous section for
references).
It is noteworthy that this type of model can be adapted to
include the effects of patterns of visuotactile stimulations that
go beyond spatiotemporal congruency, such as applied pressure,
duration, trajectory, frequency, velocity or predictability. Recent
studies have observed that some of these features, closely related
to affective and emotional aspects of touch, (e.g., the velocity
of the applied stimulation) can significantly modulate the RHI
(Crucianelli et al., 2013; Lloyd et al., 2013; van Stralen et al.,
2014). Particularly concerning the predictability of the visuotac-
tile stimulation, the probability of two independent visuotactile
patterns being spatiotemporally congruent is lower the higher
their complexity. Therefore, being exposed to congruent patterns
of increasing complexity should lead to stronger illusions, and/or
to illusions established on shorter time scales. Although there
is no study explicitly testing this, reports in the literature sup-
port that increasing the stimulation variability can avoid habitu-
ation effects and lead to a faster and stronger illusion (Niebauer
et al., 2002; Armel and Ramachandran, 2003; Tsakiris et al., 2008;
Petkova and Ehrsson, 2009; Guterstam et al., 2011). The same
observations were reported for visuomotor stimulation (Tsakiris
et al., 2006; Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012). This evidence is consis-
tent with the proposal that unpredictability increases the weight
of multisensory likelihood in inferring a common body.
A similar causal inference model can be applied to address the
induction of BOIs in presence of visuomotor stimuli. In this case,
visual and proprioceptive inputs that change dynamically in time
can provide accumulating evidence in favor of a single cause if
congruent—p(C = 1 | mV, x
→τ
V , x
→τ
P ). Such a formulation can
further bring forward the question of whether some crossmodal
stimuli contribute more in inferring our own body than others.
Congruent visuotactile or visuomotor stimuli between the real
and rubber index finger was shown to elicit the RHI without sig-
nificant differences (Riemer et al., 2013; Kalckert and Ehrsson,
2014a). Nevertheless, when testing the relative role of visuomo-
tor and visuotactile correlations between the real and the virtual
lower limbs under the same experimental condition, a stronger
contribution of visuomotor stimuli was found in inducing the
BOI, whilst incongruent stimulation of each of the two led equally
to its break (Kokkinara and Slater, 2014). Given that visuomotor
correlations contain a larger amount of information compared
to visuotactile correlations (e.g., in terms of the internal model
involved), the proposed model would predict a faster onset of
BOIs. Moreover, this facilitation might also depend on which
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body parts are involved in the movements (e.g., moving the index
finger vs. moving an entire upper or lower limb). However, these
predictions need to be explicitly tested.
Finally, the same model could be reformulated and extended
to account for the full BOIs taking into account the relevant
pieces of multimodal and semantic information.
Network Models
Connectionist models offer an alternative approach for address-
ing the problem of BOIs. Although they have not been previously
envisioned in this context, these models have been successfully
applied in the field of multisensory integration as an alternative
approach to Bayesian models (e.g., Patton and Anastasio, 2003;
Martin et al., 2009; Cuppini et al., 2011). Connectionist models
implement artificial networks with architectures that are typi-
cally inspired from neurobiological structures and are suited to
simulate learning mechanisms and collective neuronal behavior.
They therefore offer an important advantage with respect to the
Bayesian approaches, as they can provide deeper insights into
the neural mechanisms involved in the processes under study,
although at the expense of higher complexity (Fernandes and
Kording, 2010)
Apart from reproducing some of the most relevant properties
of multisensory processing at the level of neural activity (Patton
and Anastasio, 2003; Rowland et al., 2007; Martin et al., 2009),
recent implementations have been proposed to account for per-
ceptual illusions. For example, relatively simple networks, con-
sisting of two layers reciprocally interconnected, could reproduce
common illusions such as the sound-induced flash illusion and
fusion (Cuppini et al., 2014), as well as the ventriloquist effect
and aftereffect (Magosso et al., 2012).
Particularly relevant for the present discussion is the imple-
mentation of neural networks whose dynamics reproduces
several observed properties of visuotactile processing. For
example, a network with two unimodal and one bimodal areas,
could reproduce effects of visuotactile integration such as
the facilitation of tactile detection, localization and acuity, by
concurrent visual information (Magosso, 2010). Modifications
of this implementation have been shown to reproduce other key
aspects of visuotactile integration. For example, by including
Hebbian learning mechanisms tuned by attentional effects
(Ursino et al., 2007; Magosso et al., 2010b), it was possible to
simulate the dynamical expansion of the peripersonal space
observed after tool use (Maravita and Iriki, 2004). In addi-
tion, interhemispheric competition effects, similar to the ones
observed in right-brain-damaged patients (di Pellegrino et al.,
1997; Mattingley et al., 1997), have been further emulated with
models in which two replications of the network described
above (one for each hand) were interconnected by inhibitory
interneuron modules (Magosso et al., 2010a,b).
All these remarkable results address the possibility to apply
this class of model to develop new theoretical accounts for BOIs.
A plausible scenario would be to initially combine these models
with Bayesian modules. For example, while the visuotactile pro-
cessing involved in the RHI could be simulated with neural net-
works, the test-for-fit gating associated with neural populations
specialized in body parts recognition, could bemore conveniently
described with the Bayesian formalism. Alternatively, existing
implementations of neural networks for the representation of
semantic information (for a review see Ursino et al., 2014), pro-
vide a valid option for representing sematic factors in BOIs.
Such envisioned hybrid models would be indeed ideal for gain-
ing deeper insights into our current understanding of the BOIs
and their implications for own-body perception.
Conclusions
One of the important questions in neuroscience, psychology, and
philosophy concerns how we distinguish our body from the bod-
ies of others as well as from objects in the surrounding environ-
ment (Gallagher, 2000; Jeannerod, 2003; Blanke and Metzinger,
2009; de Vignemont, 2011). Body ownership illusions (BOIs) are
a powerful experimental tool to address this question, since they
permit to investigate the conditions under which we can perceive
artificial body parts or fake bodies as belonging to ourselves. In
the present review, we focused on the role of multisensory inte-
gration and semantic knowledge in inducing BOIs. In particular,
we reviewed the role of the temporal, spatial, and semantic rela-
tionship of crossmodal stimuli in the elicitation of the illusions
as reflected in several experimental studies, and we further dis-
cussed and proposed theoretical accounts in order to cast all this
information into one computational framework.
Given the vastness of the experimental literature around BOIs,
the present review is not exhaustive. For example, we focused
on BOIs induced in presence of visual information, excluding
therefore the somatic versions of BOIs and similar body illusions
induced with auditory cues (Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012). Nev-
ertheless, similar principles to those proposed here have been
revealed: e.g., temporal constraints in visuotactile integration
(Ehrsson et al., 2005a) and negligible effects of tactile quality
(White et al., 2010). In addition, we did not address the important
contribution of interoceptive signals in the sense of body owner-
ship (Seth, 2013), although this has recently shown to influence
different aspects of BOIs (Crucianelli et al., 2013; Lloyd et al.,
2013; van Stralen et al., 2014).
Moreover, our theoretical proposals based on computational
principles that combine and integrate exteroceptive and propri-
oceptive signals for explaining the induction of BOIs, do not
imply that the emergence of the sense of body ownership relies
on a strictly deterministic computation. For example, interocep-
tive signals and emotional states are fundamental in our sense
of embodiment (Carruthers, 2008; Seth, 2013). Nevertheless, we
consider that formulating and experimentally validating compu-
tationalmodels, even if these are approximate and not exhaustive,
can be a first step toward deciphering the mechanisms underly-
ing BOIs. These approaches can be extended to include further
contributions and to account for a more holistic view of our own
body-perception.
Beside the necessity for experimental validation of such the-
oretical models, future studies are needed to investigate whether
and how the contribution of spatial, temporal, and semantic
characteristics of crossmodal stimuli changes once BOIs are
experienced. That is, while we discussed the experimental
principles in the context of inducing the illusions, there is the
possibility that these spatial, temporal, and semantic constraints
are adapted after the onset of the illusion—a possibility discussed
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above as part of the causal model. The study of Hohwy and
Paton (2010) points certainly in this direction: once the rubber
hand illusion was induced with a standard paradigm, the illusion
could be sustained even when suddenly introducing semantic or
spatiotemporal violations in the crossmodal stimuli. The result
of this intervention was the elicitation of unusual experiences
such as tactile sensations originating from a stroked cardboard,
or supernatural tactile sensations generated by an elevated finger
that was not in contact with the rubber hand. Similarly, in the
study of Kilteni et al. (2012) the gradual introduction of semantic
violations in terms of body proportions did not abolish but
sustained the ownership illusion toward a very long fake arm.
The same question could be also applied to the temporal aspects
of visuotactile integration; for example, does the illusion persist
if the administered visuotactile stimuli progressively change
from synchronous to asynchronous? Indeed, there is evidence
suggesting that a full BOI triggered by seeing a realistic virtual
body in spatial coincidence with the physical body, could be
sustained during asynchronous visuotactile stimulation (Maselli
and Slater, 2013).
Last but not least, the present review leaves the ques-
tion of why somatoparaphrenic patients perceive their body
parts as not belonging to themselves, unanswered. Although
outside the scope of the present review, recent studies have
started to explore the induction of BOIs with somatopara-
phrenic patients (Jenkinson et al., 2013; van Stralen et al.,
2013; Bolognini et al., 2014). Investigating whether or not
the principles on multimodal triggers and semantic infor-
mation mentioned here for healthy subjects, apply also
for these patients, could provide a possible strategy to
grasp the link between delusions and illusions of body
ownership.
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